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and the practice of its implementation in Ukraine. Constituent power is associated with 
the process of adopting a constitution and making amendments to it. A distinction is 
made between primary and institutional constituent powers. The constituent nature of 
the Constitution of Ukraine in the interpretation of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is 
analyzed. The reasons why the Law “On an All-Ukrainian Referendum” was held invalid 
with regard to the constituent power of the people is considered. There is an inconsistency 
in the primary and institutional constituent powers’ interpretation of amendments to the 
Constitution of Ukraine. The constitutional reform of 2004, the interference with this reform 
by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in 2010 and its return by the parliament in 2014 
are examined from the standpoint of the constituent power concept. It is concluded that 
a new constitutional reform, which would provide a clean slate, could be an acceptable 
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Constitution, which would necessarily include procedures for popular legitimacy.
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Introduction
the Constitution of ukraine, adopted on 28 June 1996 remained unaltered for 
a long time.1 however, a sufficiently long period of stability ended due to the adoption 
of the constitutional reform of 12 december 2004. subsequently, the Constitution 
also changed in 2011, 2013 and 2016. however, it is the constitutional reform of 
2004 that became the cornerstone of not only academic and theoretical discussions, 
but also resulted in two unprecedented resolutions by ukrainian authorities, i.e. the 
Constitutional Court of ukraine (the CCu) in 2010 and the supreme Council of ukraine 
(the verkhovna rada) in 2014. this was a case of “renewal” of the effect of the text 
of the Constitution of ukraine, which was originally adopted by the decision of the 
CCu. the renewal of the 2004 reform took place due to a decision of parliament.
At the same time, the concept of constituent power is increasingly used as 
a certain precondition which is at the heart of the constitutional order on which the 
Constitution of ukraine relies and which determines the further constitutional reform. 
however, there are quite large discrepancies in its understanding in practice.
the concept of constituent power is not only a real doctrinal prerequisite for 
theoretical developments, but also finds new roots in court decisions and is used 
to justify certain laws (e.g. the part of the Law “On the All-ukrainian referendum” 
which permits the adoption of a new version of the Constitution concerning the 
All-ukrainian referendum in response to popular demand). similarly, the doctrine 
of constituent power was intended to consecrate the “renewal” of the text of the 
Constitution in February 2014.
1  Конституція України, прийнята 28 червня 1996 р., Відомості Верховної Ради України, 1996, No. 30 
[the Constitution of ukraine, adopted on 28 June 1996, Bulletin of the verkhovna rada of ukraine, 
1996, No. 30].
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the ideas to convoke the constitutional assembly, constituents and the like, 
occasionally arise. the concept of the constituent power was, in one way or another, 
the basis for the functioning of the Constitutional Assembly, and then also for the 
constitutional commission under the President of ukraine.
Consequently, the idea of further constitutional reformation, and even of a comp-
lete constitutional restoration, literally remains one of the key issues in modern legal 
discourse. that is why its effective implementation is possible only with a thorough 
understanding of the nature of the constitution and the theory of the constituent 
power that gives rise to it.
1. The Concept of Constituent Power  
as an Element of Modern Constitutionalism
First of all, let us start with the definition. As defined by tamara el khoury in the 
Max Planck encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law, pouvoir constituant 
(constituent power) is the power to establish the constitutional order of a nation.2 
the theory of constituent power played a key role in the development of the practice 
of constitutionalism. According to this theory, which specifies a more general theory 
of national sovereignty and, at the same time, is its original version, the constitution 
as the basic law is recognized as an act of the primary (constituent) power (pouvoir 
constituant), which belongs directly to the people and has the supreme legal force.3
“A legal theory of constituent power basically assumes that it is a legal power, 
which implies that the undoing power has a legal charter.”4 the theory of constituent 
power was thoroughly outlined by emmanuel sieyès, who first used the term in 1789. 
he emphasized that the state bodies qualified as the constituted “authorities” cannot 
amend the constitution as an act of the constituent power. As volodymyr shapoval 
states, this thesis is what resulted in the constitution not being changed often.5
the idea of an unlimited constituent power which belongs exclusively to the 
community of sovereign citizens and is brought into action at their discretion was 
widespread due to the theory of natural law, thanks to Pufendorf and wolf, and its 
practical application is first found in the united states, and then in revolutionary France, 
along with its theoretical expression in the doctrine of the pouvoir constituant, where 
all state authorities originate and unite.6 Constituent power has been a revolutionary 
2  tamara el khoury, Pouvoir Constituant, Oxford Constitutional Law (december 2017) (sep. 15, 2018), 
available at http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e709.
3  Шаповал В.М. Сучасний конституціоналізм [volodymyr M. shapoval, Contemporary Constitutionalism] 
28 (kyiv: yurinkom inter, 2005).
4  The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 422 (M. rosenfeld & A. sajó (eds.), Oxford: 
Oxford university Press, 2012).
5  shapoval 2005, at 29.
6  Еллинек Г. Общее учение о государстве [Georg Jellinek, General Doctrine of the State] 488–489 (st. 
Petersburg: yuridicheskiy tsentr Press, 2004).
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concept from the very beginning.7 in the usA, the concept of constituent power is 
derived from the preamble of the u.s. Constitution, which begins with the words “we 
the People of the united states...”8
As eduard Pontovich states, the establishment of the constitution of a state 
is bound to give birth to the idea of the existence of a permanent authority, 
which establishes and revises the constitution, of the people, a community of 
free and equal individuals. this power, which is supreme in the state, guarantees 
the inviolability of the rights of the individual since it determines the entire state 
system. Later, it received the name of the constituent power. this idea could not have 
originated before. the establishment of constitutions of the modern period and the 
establishment of the contract of free, equal individuals marked the destruction of 
the entire historical past. the establishment of a constitution meant, at the same 
time, the foundation of a new society and a new state, which thus acquired the 
principles of unity consisting of a community of equal individuals, a mechanical or 
arithmetic integer. A constitutional treaty does not become a contract between the 
authorities on the one hand and another civilian power on the other hand, but is the 
agreement between the people who establish the state power. this circumstance 
is already the reason for the emergence of the idea that the people should have 
authority to establish a constitution and the constituent power.9
At the same time, the concept of constituent power is not indisputable. the 
idea of a sovereign constituent power is not the first historical understanding of 
constitution making. the eclipse of this figure by the notion of the people as the 
constituent power had to do with four notions linked to the Modern Age, namely 
the concepts of the social contract, sovereignty, the people understood as the unity 
of the whole rather than a part of the population, and the separation of powers.10 
Moreover, according to Moris Oriu, the French experience diverted science from the 
theory of the constituent power. in addition, in his opinion,
this concept in itself does not stand up to scrutiny, as well as the doctrine of 
the delegation of government. A nation, separated from their governing bodies, 
has no more institutional or governing competence. therefore, the creation or 
revision of the constitution should be accomplished by regular governmental 
7  Nico krisch, Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational order, 14(3) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 657 (2016).
8  See more The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 375 (M. Loughlin & 
N. walker (eds.), Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2007); Andrew Arato, Post Sovereign Constitution 
Making: Learning and Legitimacy 320 (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2016).
9  Понтович Э.Э. Развитие конституции и учредительная власть [eduard e. Pontovich, Development 
of the Constitution and the Constituent Power] 35–36 (Petrograd: Ogni, 1918).
10  Andrew Arato, The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond Revolutions? 45 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 2017).
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jurisdiction. it can only be engaged to adhere to certain formalities for the 
celebration of constitutional laws.11
however, this idea did not find recognition in science and the concept of the 
constituent power continued its development.
According to Jean-Paul Jacqué, a constituent power is an assembly of bodies 
responsible for the development and revision of the constitution.12 he distinguishes 
between primary and institutional constituent power.
the primary constituent power develops a constitution when there is no other 
acting constitution. such a situation may arise either as a result of the formation 
of a new state, or as a result of a revolution that terminated the operation of the 
previous constitution.
in both cases, the primary constituent power is unconditional (inconditionné) 
when establishing a new legal order. the source of the primary constituent power is 
the political order (ordre politique), because the constituent power is the power of the 
fact embodied in its constancy and the ideas embedded in this power, due to which 
the constitution is developed. the primary constituent power and its legitimacy 
depend on the success of the revolution. the adoption of the constitution indicates 
the goals of the government and marks the ascent to power of a certain government 
on the basis of law. the adoption of the constitution means the disappearance of 
the primary constituent power, which, having fulfilled its tasks, clears a space for the 
institutional constituent power.
the institutional constituent power is established by the constitution; this power 
is charged with amendments of the constitutional act. in this role, it can only act in 
accordance with the constitutional act and must abide the restrictions contained in 
the constitution with respect to the procedure for revision of its content.13
the authoritative German scholar, Carl schmitt, wrote about the primary 
constituent power, distinguishing between the sovereign and commissar dictatorship. 
it should be mentioned that schmitt developed the doctrine of the guarantor of the 
Constitution, as well as the doctrine of sovereignty. he is the author of the statement 
that “the sovereign is the person who decides on the state of emergency.”14
distinguishing between commissar and sovereign dictatorships, schmitt, in 
essence, speaks of two fundamentally different strategies of governing behavior in 
11  Ориу М. Основы публичного права [Moris Oriu, Foundations of Public Law] 633 (Moscow: Communist 
Academy Publishing house, 1929).
12  Жакке Ж.-П. Конституционное право и политические институты [Jean-Paul Jacqué, Constitutional 
Law and Political Institutions] 107 (Moscow: yurist, 2002).
13  Id. at 108.
14  Шмитт К. Политическая теология [Carl schmitt, Political Theology] 15 (Moscow: kANONPresstsB, 
2000).
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the context of anomie.15 in sovereign and commissar dictatorships, the concept of 
dictatorship includes the idea of the status that should be provided by the activities 
of the dictator. their legal essence lies in eliminating, in order to achieve the goal, 
legal barriers and obstacles which, in every respect, are an unhindered obstacle to the 
achievement of this goal. similar to self-defense, dictatorship is never only a single 
action but a counteraction as well. therefore, it assumes that the opponent does 
not adhere to those legal rules that the dictator considers to be decisive as a legal 
foundation. the commissioner dictatorship abolishes the constitution in concreto 
to protect the same constitution with its specific content. the same argument has 
been used for a long time (most often and insistently, by Lincoln): if the content of 
constitution is threatened, it can be secured by the temporary suspension of the 
constitution. the dictatorship can protect the constitution from destruction.16
From the point of view of the commissar dictatorship, the dictator’s action must 
lead to a condition under which rights can be exercised, since any legal norm assumes 
a normal state as a homogeneous environment in which it exists. As a result, the 
dictatorship becomes a problem of a certain reality, but it does not cease to be a legal 
problem. the legal force of the constitution can be suspended, but the constitution 
itself does not cease to operate, because such suspension relates to a special case. 
the sovereign dictatorship, however, considers the existing system as on that can 
be eliminated by its action. it does not suspend the current constitution by virtue 
of its constitutional right which was established, but makes an attempt to create 
a condition allowing a constitution which would meet all its requirements to be 
enforced.17 in fact, according to Carl schmitt, a sovereign dictatorship is considered 
a constituent power.
As for ukraine, the issue of the content and specific forms of the implementation 
of constituent power was the subject of a study by ruslana Maksakova “Constitutional 
and Legal Problems of the Organization and implementation of the Constituent Power 
in ukraine.”18 According to Maksakova’s criterion of implementation approaches, there 
are three distinct forms of constituent power: 1) revolutionary constituent power; 
2) reformatory constituent power; and 3) functional institutional power. elections, 
15  Подоксёнов Д.В. Чрезвычайное положение и парадокс суверенности // Социосфера. 2013. No. 1. 
C. 61–63 [dmitry v. Podoksyonov, The State of Emergency and the Paradox of Sovereignty, 1 sociosphere 
61 (2013)].
16  Шмитт К. Диктатура. От истоков современной идеи суверенитета до пролетарской классовой 
борьбы [Carl schmitt, Dictatorship. From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian 
Class Struggle] 156–157 (st. Petersburg: Nauka, 2005).
17  Id. at 158.
18  Максакова Р.М. Конституційно-правові проблеми організації та реалізації установчої влади 
в Україні [ruslana M. Maksakova, Constitutional and Legal Problems of the Organization and 
Implementation of the Constituent Power in Ukraine] (Zaporozhye: Classic Private university Publishing 
house, 2012).
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referenda, general meetings of citizens at their place of residence, local initiatives, public 
hearings, and the recall of a deputy are classified as constituent power by the scholar.19 
this is a rather broad approach to the interpretation of the constituent power. A broad 
understanding of the constituent power makes it synonymous with popular sovereignty. 
Not having a purpose to analyze all the described interpretations of the constituent 
power and the forms of its implementations, we shall only mention that such different 
approaches to the understanding of the constituent power, as well as references to 
it and its use in the state and legal system, do not contribute to the development of 
a consistent constitutional concept for reforming the Constitution of ukraine.
stanislav shevchuk’s position seems to be more reasonable. he states that 
constitutionalism, is based on the distinction between the constituent power of 
the people, who, by means of the exercise of their sovereignty, adopt a constitution 
which secures the freedom of individuals and guarantees the principle of “limited 
rule” which arises from the theory of a social contract, and the state’s power, which in 
democracies is closely linked to the electoral power of the electorate.20 we also agree 
with Myhailo savchin, who defines constituent power as an order of organization and 
procedure for the confirmation of the constitution in accordance with the democratic 
and open principles of the implementation of the procedure for the adoption or 
revision of the Basic Law, which has the supreme legal force.21
we believe that the ukrainian concept of the constituent power should be based 
on the works by Carl schmitt, Jean-Paul Jacqué, Andrew Arato, András sajó and other 
scholars and should be associated with the process of adopting a constitution and 
making legislative amendments to it.
2. The Nature of the Constitution of Ukraine  
as an Act of Constituent Power
the CCu declared (para. 2 of the declaration of intent of the CCu of 3 October 1997 
No. 4-zp in the case of the constitutional filing of Oleksandr Leonidovich Barabash 
concerning the official interpretation of part 5 of Article 94 and Article 160 of the 
Constitution of ukraine (on entry into legal force of the Constitution of ukraine)):
the Constitution of ukraine, being the Basic Law of the state, is, by its 
legal nature, an act of the constituent power belonging to the people. the 
constituent power in relation to constituted authorities is supreme: it is in 
19 Maksakova 2012, at 436.
20  Шевчук C. Судова правотворчість: світовий досвід і перспективи в Україні [stanislav shevchuk, 
Judicial Law-Making: World Experience and Perspectives in Ukraine] 149 (kyiv: Abstract, 2007).
21  Савчин М.В. Конституціоналізм і природа конституції [Myhailo v. savchin, Constitutionalism and 
the Nature of the Constitution] 302 (uzhhorod: Polygraphic Center “Lira,” 2009).
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the Constitution of ukraine that the principle of the division of state power is 
declared... and the principles of the organization of the established authorities, 
including the legislative one, are determined. the adoption of the Constitution 
of ukraine by the verkhovna rada of ukraine meant that the constituent power 
was exercised by the parliament.22
the connection of the Constitution of ukraine with the concept of constituent 
power became possible due to the preamble of the Constitution (“the verkhovna 
rada of ukraine on behalf of the ukrainian people, the citizens of ukraine of all ethnic 
groups... adopts this Constitution, the Basic Law of ukraine”) as well as positions of 
the CCu on this issue.
the adoption of the Constitution of ukraine by the verkhovna rada of 
ukraine was a direct act of the sovereignty of the people, who only once 
authorized the verkhovna rada of ukraine to do so. this is secured by part 1  
of Article 85 of the Constitution of ukraine, which does not authorize the 
verkhovna rada of ukraine to adopt the Constitution of ukraine, as well as by 
Article 156 of the Constitution of ukraine, according to which the amendments 
bill to the sections establishing the principles of the constitutional order 
in ukraine after its adoption in the verkhovna rada of ukraine are to be 
approved by an all-ukrainian referendum,
as subparagraph 1 of paragraph 4 to the declaration of intent of CCu of 11 July 
1997 No. 3-zp states.23
the above is confirmed in the verdict of the CCu of 10 May 2005 (subparagraph 4.3: 
“when adopting the Constitution of ukraine on 28 June 1996, the sovereign will of 
the people was mediated by the verkhovna rada of ukraine”). in this regard, yury 
Barabash asks why the Court expressed the firm belief that it was the people of 
ukraine who authorized parliament to exercise their (people’s) constituent power 
and authority.24 the question is rather rhetorical.
Moreover, on the ground of this argumentation, in the above decision, the CCu 
declared that the Constitution of ukraine entered into force immediately upon its 
adoption, without being published (official publication took place only 14 days 
after its adoption).
22  Available at http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v004p710-97.
23  Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v003p710-97.
24  Барабаш Ю.Г. Право визначення конституційного ладу народом України // Конституційна 
асамблея: політико-правові аспекти діяльності. 2012. No. 3. C. 4–12 [yury G. Barabash, The Right 
to Determine the Constitutional Order by the People of Ukraine, 3 Constitutional Assembly: Political and 
Legal Aspects of Activity 4 (2012)].
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having no doubt in the legitimacy of the current Constitution, there is a question 
in this context – which power (primary or institutional) did the verkhovna rada use 
when adopting the Constitution of ukraine? it turns out that it was primary power, 
but it acted on behalf of the people as the only legitimate national representative 
political body.
Also, according to the CCu (para. 21 of the declaration of intent of 26 April 2018 
No. 4-p/2018),
being a result of the exercise of the constituent power of the people, 
the Constitution of ukraine, by establishing a procedure for amending it, 
determines the procedural limits for the exercise of power and the people 
themselves.25
therefore, being by its nature the result of the implementation of the primary 
constitutive power, it regulates the institutional constituent power of the people.
As yury Barabash rightly notes, the constituent power of the ukrainian people 
as a constitutional phenomenon is only acquiring its distinct features.26 At the same 
time, the concept of constituent power is not only a real doctrinal prerequisite for 
theoretical developments and the practice of rule-making, law enforcement and 
interpretation of the norms of law, but is sometimes understood superficially and 
used to substantiate rather debatable legislative provisions. in particular, this is 
a question of the statutory provision of the Law “On the All-ukrainian referendum,” 
specifically the part which allowed the adoption of a new version of the Constitution 
at an all-ukrainian referendum on the people’s initiative, contrary to the constitutional 
language itself.
Moreover, let us take the liberty to put question the allegedly axiomatic nature 
of the implementation of the concept of constituent power in the current Basic 
Law. Questions arise in the analysis of its entire text, in particular, Article 5 of the 
Constitution, as well as section Xiii on amendments to the Constitution.
3. Institutional Constituent Power and the Constitution  
of Ukraine
3.1. Adoption of the New Constitution
On the one hand, Article 5 of the Constitution speaks of the exclusive right of the 
people to define and change the constitutional order, and on the other hand, in the 
25  Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v004p710-18.
26  Барабаш Ю.Г. Установча влада українського народу як конституційний феномен // Право України. 
2009. №. 11. C. 79 [yury G. Barabash, The Constituent Power of the Ukrainian People as a Constitutional 
Phenomenon, 11 Law of ukraine 73, 79 (2009)].
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text of the Constitution, there are no procedural provisions regarding institutional 
constituent power, that is, there is no mechanism for implementation of the people’s 
right to determine the constitutional system, if the right to adopt a new constitution 
is meant by it. the CCu has had to respond to this question and it finally rendered 
a judgment declaring the present ability of citizens, at a referendum held at the 
people’s initiative, to establish a new system of adopting the Constitution under 
a procedure which has to be outlined in the Constitution and laws of ukraine 
(decision of the CCu of 16 April 2008 No. 6- rp/2008).27
this order has never been reflected in the Constitution. At the same time, the 
appropriate attempt was made at the de jure level of the law. Certain statutory 
provisions of the Law “On the All-ukrainian referendum” of 6 November 2012 
No. 5475-vi provided for the right to adopt a new constitution at a nationwide 
referendum held at the people’s initiative.28 thus, part 2 of Article 15 states:
By means of the all-ukrainian referendum held at the people’s initiative, 
the ukrainian, people being the holders of sovereignty and the only source 
of power in ukraine, are entitled to exercise their exclusive right to define and 
change the constitutional order in ukraine by adopting the Constitution of 
ukraine (the constituent power) as prescribed by this Law.
the legitimization of the corresponding procedure in the law was directly 
deduced from the concept of the constituent power. however, this Law was declared 
unconstitutional in accordance with the decision of the CCu of 26 April 2018 
No. 4-p/2018. the reason for its unconstitutionality was the violation of the procedure 
for the adoption of the law itself. Composing the rationale of the judgment, the CCu 
also referred to norms of substantive law, but all of these provisions concerned issues 
of unconstitutionality of norms regarding amendments to the Constitution of ukraine. 
in the text of the decision there is no express reference to the unconstitutionality 
of the norm envisaging the possibility of adopting a new constitution of ukraine at 
a referendum.
3.2. Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine
with regard to amendments to the Constitution, a few questions arise when 
analyzing section Xiii, which is directly devoted to this procedure.
As recorded in the text of the Constitution, there is a clear procedure; according to 
which the verkhovna rada is chiefly responsible for amendments. Only amendment 
27  Available at http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v006p710-08.
28  Закон України від 06.11.2012 No. 5475-vi «Про всеукраїнський референдум», Відомості Верховної 
Ради України, 2013, No. 44–45 [Law of ukraine No. 5475-vi of 6 November 2012. On the All-ukrainian 
referendum, Bulletin of the verkhovna rada of ukraine, 2016, Nos. 44–54].
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of sections І, ІІІ and ХІІІ requires the people to participate directly (at a referendum). in 
this regard, the question is how this procedure relates to Article 5 of the Constitution, 
which refers to the people’s right not only to determine, but also to amend the 
constitutional system. the aforementioned Law “On the All-ukrainian referendum” 
gave people the right to amend the Constitution at a referendum, without the 
participation of the verkhovna rada of ukraine, but this provision was declared as 
contrary to section Xiii of the Constitution of ukraine. As the CCu states (para. 21 of 
the declaration of intent of 26 April 2018 No. 4-p/2018),
As a result of the exercise of the constituent power of the people, the Con-
stitution of ukraine, by establishing a procedure for amending it, determines 
the procedural limits for the exercise of power by the people themselves.29
we can also cite subparagraph 2 of the operative part of the decision of the CCu 
of 27 March 2000 No. 3-rp/2000 (all-ukrainian referendum at the people’s initiative 
case).30 the CCu stated that
the issues approved by the all-ukrainian referendum at the people’s initiative, 
set forth in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 2 of the Presidential decree  
“On the Proclamation of an All-ukrainian referendum at the People’s initiative,” 
are obligatory for consideration and decision-making in the procedure 
established by the Constitution of ukraine, in particular, its section Xiii 
“Amendments to the Constitution of ukraine” and the laws of ukraine.
in other words, the CCu practically made it impossible for the people to implement 
constituent power directly at a referendum by amending the Constitution of ukraine; 
in the CCu’s opinion, it should necessarily be mediated by the verkhovna rada of 
ukraine by amending the Constitution of ukraine in its section Xiii. Consequently, 
the recognition of the referendum as a way to implement constituent power in 
ukraine is problematic, since the Constitution of ukraine itself does not consider 
it necessary when making amendments to it (a referendum is only obligatory for 
sections i, iii and Xiii).
At the same time, there is a question regarding whether the current procedure 
can be amended to comply with the concept of the constituent power as such. 
A distinction given by Georg Jellinek is quite interesting. in his opinion, in states 
with constitutions based on the constituent power of the people, – amendments are 
made either by a direct popular vote or by dissolution of the parliament chambers 
with another appeal to voters, discussion of revisions in special “audit” chambers 
29  Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v004p710-18.
30  Available at http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v003p710-00.
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or at conventions. in other states, various extraordinary forms of amendment are 
employed, among which the majority requirement plays an important role. then, 
multiple voting to revise or vote in the subsequent one-on-one legislative meetings 
is often required.31
As stated, only sections i, iii and Xiii of the Constitution of ukraine require a direct 
popular vote when making amendments to them. the rest of the amendments 
do not stipulate a popular vote or the dissolution of the verkhovna rada. in this 
regard, attention should be drawn to the fact that the dissolution of the parliament is 
a mandatory stage in the amendment of many constitutions (e.g. in the Netherlands 
and iceland). therefore, it is worth supporting yury Barabash in his view that such 
a procedure for constitutional reform is one of the most optimal32 and should be 
considered for implementation during the reform of the current Basic Law.
4. Constitutional Reform of 2004
in practice, ukraine faced the problem of constituent power when amendments 
to the Constitution took place with procedural violations in 2004. On 8 december 
2004, the verkhovna rada of ukraine adopted a Bill No. 4180 on amendments 
to the Constitution – the Law of ukraine of 8 december 2004 No. 2222-iv “On 
Amendments to the Constitution of ukraine” (hereinafter the Law No. 2222).33 thus, 
amendments to the Constitution of ukraine are the first changes to be finally 
approved, since the adoption and entry into legal force of the text of the Constitution 
on 28 June 1996.
At the same time, experts and scholars drew attention to the fact that there 
were some procedural violations during the adoption of the abovementioned law 
when introducing amendments to the Constitution of ukraine (i.e. the absence of 
corresponding preliminary findings by the CCu, block voting, and a lack of discussion). 
these violations were referred to in the Conclusion of the National Commission for 
Consolidation of democracy and the supremacy of Law of 27 december 2005 on 
compliance with the terms of the constitutional procedure when amending the 
Constitution of ukraine in 1996 by adopting the Law of ukraine of 8 december 2004 
No. 2222-iv “On Amendments to the Constitution of ukraine” and on the compliance 
with its provisions on the general principles of the Constitution of ukraine of 1996 
and european standards.
31  Jellinek 2004, at 511.
32  Барабаш Ю.Г. Державно-правові конфлікти в теорії та практиці конституційного права [yury G. 
Barabash, State and Legal Conflicts in the Theory and Practice of Constitutional Law] 181 (kharkiv: Pravo, 
2008).
33  Закон України від 08.12.2004 No. 2222-iv «Про внесення змін до Конституції України», Відомості 
Верховної Ради України, 2005, No. 2 [Law of ukraine No. 2222-iv of 8 december 2004. On Amendments 
to the Constitution of ukraine, Bulletin of the verkhovna rada of ukraine, 2005, No. 2].
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some experts pointed out a number of other violations that they believed were 
committed. vsevolod rechitsky argued that the amendments to the Constitution 
were adopted in conditions of public emergency,34 which is prohibited by the 
Constitution itself. in the opinion of B. Futea’s opinion, a u.s. federal court judge, 
despite the fact that the amendments to the Constitution of ukraine did not formally 
relate to Chapters i, iii and Xiii, Article 5 of the Constitution stipulates that
the right to determine and change the constitutional order in ukraine 
belongs exclusively to the people and shall not be usurped by the state, its 
bodies or officials.
therefore, the procedure for revision of the Basic Law under all circumstances 
is to provide for the mandatory holding of a referendum as a way of ratifying 
a constitutional law passed by parliament.
since the only body in ukraine with constitutional jurisdiction is the CCu, an 
assessment of the arguments for violations when adopting amendments to the 
Constitution of ukraine and providing these arguments with legal consequences 
could be made by means of verification of constitutionality of the law on amendments 
to the Constitution. At the same time, it should be noted that the exercise of 
constitutional legality control on amendments to the constitution has its own specific 
characteristics as compared with the exercise of such control over common laws, 
and the status of such laws as compared with common laws is often declared in the 
doctrine as being different from common laws passed by parliament.
in the legal doctrine and practice of the constitutional controlling bodies of 
different countries, two different approaches were formed. According to the first 
one, the constitutional controlling body is not empowered to verify the laws on 
amendments to the constitution. this position was set out in the decision of the Cons-
titutional Council of France on 26 March 2003 (Décision n° 2003-469 DC du 26 mars 
2003).35 the Constitutional Council declared that it can only pass a judgment in 
cases established by the constitution itself. At the same time, the law on amending 
the constitution has a special nature and is not a common law that is subject to 
constitutional control.
the opposite is to recognize laws on amending the constitution as being common 
laws and, thus, the constitutional controlling body has the right to verify their 
34  Речицький В. Втілюючи принципи верховенства права: політико-правовий коментар положень 
Рішення Конституційного Суду України у справі про додержання процедури внесення змін до 
Конституції України // Вісник Конституційного Суду України. 2010. No. 6. С. 142–151 [vsevolod 
rechitsky, Implementing the Principles of the Rule of Law: Political and Legal Comment on the Provisions of 
the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the Case of Adhering to the Procedure for Amending 
the Constitution of Ukraine, 6 Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of ukraine 142 (2010)].
35  Available at https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2003/2003469dC.htm.
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constitutionality. An example of such an approach is the decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Moldova of 4 March 2016.36 the Constitutional Court of Moldova declared 
unconstitutional the procedure of amendments to the constitution adopted by the 
parliament 15 years ago to change the procedure of electing the president. the 
finding of the Constitutional Court referred to the restoration of civil rights for citizens 
to elect the president. this decision was criticized: the Constitutional Court cannot 
amend the Constitution. it has the right to make decisions on the constitutionality 
of less important laws than constitutional ones. After its adoption, any constitutional 
law becomes a part of the Constitution. And, in this case, according to the former 
Moldovan Ambassador to the u.N. and the Council of europe, Alexei tulbure, “the 
court has no authority to amend anything.”37
Consequently, there are two approaches to the rights of the constitutional 
controlling body in terms of considering the laws to amend a constitution. A number 
of countries support this right, while others deny it. Moreover, as a rule, it depends 
on the activism or self-limitation of the constitutional court itself and stems from the 
practice of its activities and the legal doctrine of the country in question. therefore, 
it is impossible to consider only one of the approaches as uniquely right.
in the case of ukraine, the Constitution provides for preliminary constitutional 
control of the proposed law on amending the Constitution of ukraine in compliance 
with Articles 157, 158. As for the next constitutional revision, there are no explicit 
provisions for eligibility or ineligibility in the CCu in such cases. therefore, it is necessary 
to analyze the legal positions of the CCu on this issue, which are quite controversial.
First of all, it is worth mentioning the legal position of the CCu concerning its 
decision of 11 March 2003 No. 6-rp/2003 in the case on the constitutional filing of 
a petition by 73 people’s deputies in compliance with the Constitution of ukraine for 
the right for the President of ukraine to veto the Law of ukraine “On Amendments 
adopted by the verkhovna rada of ukraine to Article 98 of the Constitution of 
ukraine” and its proposals:
the fact is that the authority to amend the Constitution of ukraine is exer-
cised by the verkhovna rada of ukraine by adopting laws... the procedure for 
36  hotărâre nr. 7 din 04.03.2016 privind controlul constituţionalităţii unor prevederi ale Legii nr. 1115-
Xiv din 5 iulie 2000 cu privire la modificarea şi completarea Constituţiei republicii Moldova [decision 
No. 7 of 4 March 2016. On the Control of the Constitutionality of some Provisions of Law No. 1115-
Xiv of 5 July 2000 on Amendments to the Constitution of the republic of Moldova] (sep. 15, 2018), 
available at http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?tip=hotariri&docid=558&l=ru.
37  Экс-посол РМ в Совете Европы: «Решение Конституционного суда – коварная игра Плахотнюка 
и попытка избежать протестов; КС не может вносить изменения в Конституцию» // totul.md. 
8 марта 2016 г. [Former Ambassador of the republic of Moldova to the Council of europe: “the 
decision of the Constitutional Court is an insidious Play by Plakhotnyuk and an Attempt to Avoid 
Protests; the Constitutional Court Cannot Amend the Constitution,” totul.md, 8 March 2016] (sep. 15, 
2018), available at http://old.totul.md/ru/newsitem/1015020.html.
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the adoption of laws amending the Constitution of ukraine by the verkhovna 
rada of ukraine, as defined in section Xiii of the Basic Law of ukraine, does not 
provide for a specific procedure for signing and promulgating such laws.38
thus, the CCu refused to accept the specific legal nature of the laws on 
amendments to the Constitution, in particular their constituent nature. the CCu 
also refused to accept the fact that, in this case, the verkhovna rada of ukraine 
does not exercise a legislative function, but implements the constituent power on 
behalf of the people, and that the law on the relevant amendments is an act of the 
constituent power of the people and therefore is not a common law. the fact of the 
recognition of the equal status of common laws and laws on amendments to the 
Constitution of ukraine from the doctrinal perspective allowed establishment of the 
possibility of exercising the following constitutional control over them by the CCu 
in the same way as over the ordinary act of parliament.
Nevertheless, the CCu refused, by its decision of 5 February 2008, to start 
proceedings in the case concerning compliance with the Constitution of ukraine 
(constitutionality) of the Law of ukraine “On Amendments to the Constitution of 
ukraine,” the Law of ukraine “On Amendments to section iv ‘Final and transitional 
Provisions,’” and the Law of ukraine “On the Constitutional Court of ukraine.”39
At the same time, in another decision – concerning the powers of the CCu of 
26 June 2008 No. 13-rp/2008 – the CCu came to a different conclusion. According to 
its opinion, the Court is authorized to exercise the following constitutional control 
over the law on amending the Constitution of ukraine after its entry into force. 
At this stage, the conceptual contravention of the positions of the CCu in its various 
decisions was first laid.
5. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine  
of 30 September 2010
the position of the CCu, set out in decision of 26 June 2008 No. 13-rp/2008, 
found its logical development in decision of 30 september 2010 No. 20-rp/2010 in 
the case concerning the compliance of the Constitution of ukraine (constitutionality) 
with the Law of ukraine of 8 december 2004 No. 2222-iv “On Amendments to the 
Constitution of ukraine” (on compliance with the procedure for amending the 
Constitution of ukraine) (hereinafter decision No. 20-rp/2010). the CCu declared 
the Law No. 2222 to be unconstitutional and, in subparagraph 4 of clause 6 of the 
decision, it expressly stated that the recognition of the law as unconstitutional in 
connection with violation of the procedure for its consideration and approval, means 
38  Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v006p710-03.
39  Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/va06u710-08.
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the revival of the previous version of the norms of the Constitution of ukraine, which 
were amended, supplemented and excluded by the Law No. 2222.
it is worth paying attention to the fact that the Constitution does not say anything 
about the “revival of the previous version of the norms of the Constitution of ukraine,” 
and this conclusion was made by the CCu on the basis of a similar procedure involving 
the revival of the operation of the versions of common laws. in this case, the text of 
the Constitution in force which by its nature differs from common laws and is the 
Basic Law as well as the act of the constituent power, underwent a modification 
while another version of its norms was restored as a result of a court decision, which 
is quite an extraordinary phenomenon.
the venice Commission, in its special finding “On the Constitutional situation 
in ukraine” of 17 december 2010, conducted a detailed analysis of this situation, 
cautiously pointing out the risks caused by the decision of CCu, in particular pointing 
out that (para. 70):
the activities of the main state bodies are currently based on rules changed 
by the court, and not on the rules which were amended by the verkhovna 
rada of ukraine as a democratic legitimate body.
having considered the two values – the legal procedure and the necessity to 
control its compliance and legal certainty as well as respect for the political legitimacy 
of the law on amending the Constitution adopted by the political representative 
body of the people, i.e. the verkhovna rada – the CCu actually determined the value 
of the necessity to observe the legal procedure as a priority and the amendments 
to the Constitution of ukraine were invalidated due to technical issues.
At the same time a procedural violation was made since some of the amended 
norms had not been preliminarily verified by the CCu in compliance with Articles 157, 
158 of the Constitution. the CCu, in its decision No. 20-rp/2010, gave no evaluation 
to the amendments in accordance with Articles 157, 158 of the Constitution. taking 
this fact into account, the question is: what was the purpose of authorizing the CCu 
to provide preliminary constitutional control? relying on the fact that such control 
was not fully implemented preliminarily, disregarding its purpose and post factum 
evaluation of the amendments from the material side, that is, in accordance with 
Articles 157 and 158, the recognition of the entire law as unconstitutional was too 
formal.
even Bohdan Futey, who emphasized the unconstitutionality of the adopted Law 
No. 2222, drew attention to the fact that the CCu had adopted a decision that was 
contrary to the other decisions adopted by the Court before, without indicating the 
influence of a new decision on its previous decisions. his remarks also concerned the 
legitimacy of elected governing bodies, appointed or created under the Constitution 
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by the amendments of 2004.40 the decision also received numerous positive and 
negative judgments (viktor kolisnyk, vsevolod rechitsky41).
6. Restoration of the Text of the Constitution of Ukraine  
in 2014
subsequently, the decision of the CCu was considered incompatible with 
the Constitution, and it was proposed to adopt the “Act on the restoration of 
the Legitimacy of the Constitutional system in ukraine” (by people’s deputy inna 
Bogoslovskaya). such proposals became reality in the context of the political crisis 
when, on 21 January 2014, the verkhovna rada of ukraine adopted the Law “On 
restoring some Provisions of the Constitution of ukraine” (hereinafter the Law of 
21 February 2014)42, and on 22 February 2014 it adopted resolution No. 750-vii 
“On the text of the Constitution of ukraine Last revised or Amended on 28 June 
1996, as Amended and supplemented by the Laws of ukraine of 8 december 2004 
No. 2222-iv, of 1 February 2011 No. 2952-vi, and of 19 september 2013 No. 586-vii” 
(hereinafter the resolution of 22 February 2014).43
it is interesting that in the abovementioned resolution of 22 February 2014, in 
addition to the reference to the legal position of the CCu (decision of 5 February 
2008) and the venice Commission (conclusion of 17 december 2010), the following 
logical chain was constructed:
– the Constitution of ukraine is the act of the constituent power of the ukrainian 
people;
– the parliament has exclusive powers to amend the Constitution of ukraine as 
an element of the constituent power;
– the verkhovna rada of ukraine is the exclusive body which is authorized with 
constituent power and this unquestionably makes it impossible for other bodies 
of state power or their officials to take any action regarding the amendment of 
constitutional norms.
As we see, in its argumentation, the verkhovna rada of ukraine focuses on the 
concept of constituent power. thus, the special nature of the laws on amendments 
to the Constitution, their constituent nature, is focused on. Correspondingly, the 
Constitution provides for a special procedure for the adoption of such laws within 
40  Футей Б. Зауваження до рішення Конституційного Суду України від 30 вересня 2010 року // 
Права Людини в Україні. 16.11.2010 [Bohdan Futey, Remarks on the Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine of 30 September 2010, human rights in ukraine, 16 November 2010] (sep. 15, 2018), 
available at http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1289922329.
41  rechitsky 2010.
42  Available at http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/742-18.
43  Available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/750-18.
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the framework of the procedure for amendment of the Constitution of ukraine – 
such amendments only may be introduced by the verkhovna rada of ukraine.
however, while acknowledging the concept of the constituent power, the 
exclusivity of the powers of the verkhovna rada of ukraine to amend the Constitution 
of ukraine seems to be controversial. First, section Xiii itself provides for the holding 
of an all-ukrainian referendum on approval of amendments to sections i, iii, and Xiii 
of the Constitution of ukraine. secondly, in paragraph 4 of the decision of the CCu 
of 16 April 2008 in the case of the constitutional petitions of the President of ukraine 
on the official interpretation of the provisions of parts 2 and 3 of Article 5, Article 69, 
part 2 of Article 72, Article 74, part 2 of Article 94, and part 1 of Article 156 of the 
Constitution of ukraine (the case on the adoption of the Constitution and laws of 
ukraine in a referendum), it was declared that
the form of exercise of the constituent power by the people is an all-ukrainian 
referendum proclaimed by popular initiative upon the demand of not less than 
three million ukrainian citizens who have the right to vote, provided that the 
signatures for its appointment are collected in at least two thirds of the regions 
and that there are at least one hundred thousand signatures in each region.
that is why the verkhovna rada of ukraine, in its argumentation, trying to defend 
the exclusivity of its powers and insisting on the lack of corresponding powers in the 
CCu, opened a Pandora’s box. this is because the emphasis on the special constitutive 
nature of the Constitution and laws on the introduction of amendments to it as acts 
of the constituent power may lead to entirely different conclusions than those which 
were made by the verkhovna rada itself.
the position of B. Futea, which we cited above, is an example of another view. 
vsevolod rechitsky adds that
in February 2014, the verkhovna rada considered the decision of the Court 
[decision No. 20-rp/2010] as a challenge to the rada itself, interpreting the 
change of the form of government as an amendment of the “constitutional 
system.” Alas! the parliament did the same, i.e. amending the constitutional 
system without a referendum, in 2004.44
the question is: what the constitutional system is and how to understand it in the 
context of Article 5 of the Constitution of ukraine. it is possible that the verkhovna 
rada of ukraine may make such amendments to the Constitution of ukraine, which 
will affect the constitutional system (even if it is not sections І, ІІІ and ХІІІ) without 
44  Речицький В.В. Аксіоми конституціоналізму і Основний Закон України [vsevolod v. rechitsky, Axioms 
of Constitutionalism and Basic Law of Ukraine] (sep. 15, 2018), available at http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.
ua/2016/rechyckyj_Aksiomy_konstytucionalizmu.htm.
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violating the procedures. instead, such amendments are the exclusive prerogative 
of the people and the verkhovna rada has actually usurped the power. such an 
interpretation of part 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution is not excluded and can be 
admitted. that is, the absolute acquisition of the constitutive power by default by the 
verkhovna rada of ukraine is not legally consistent and we must not forget about 
the constituent power of the people in its direct form.
evaluating the argument for amending the constitutional order, it is worth 
emphasizing the ambiguity of the very concept of a “constitutional system,” the 
uncertainty of the procedure and the procedure for its amendment as a norm, and 
the absence of a corresponding universally accepted doctrinal model. if we consider 
that, in 2010, the CCu amended the constitutional order and that it was amended 
unlawfully, what does this mean? does it mean that the form of government has 
changed as a result of a decision of the CCu or only that a procedural aspect has 
been touched upon, or does it mean an unauthorized intervention has been made 
by the CCu with regard the text of the Constitution unrelated to the content of such 
intervention, in other words, assignment of authorizations, violation of the principle 
“only what is expressly permitted and provided” and the principle of the division of 
powers (procedural aspect)? did the CCu interfere with the authority of the people 
(according to this logic, a referendum should be held)? does it only mean that the 
alteration of the text of the Constitution could only be carried out by the verkhovna 
rada as the authorized body following the procedure specified in section Xiii of 
the Constitution, and in no other way? Consequently, the argument itself about 
the unlawfulness of amendment of the constitutional system by the CCu raises so 
many questions, answers to which tend to be ambiguous.
A CCu judge, vyacheslav Ovcharenko, having been dismissed from the CCu 
by resolution of the verkhovna rada of ukraine of 24 February 2014 No. 775-vii, 
appealed against his dismissal in the higher Administrative Court, which declared the 
decision of the parliament unlawful (resolution of 18 June 2014 No. 800/119/14). this 
decision was revised by the supreme Court of ukraine (decision of 2 december 2014 
No. 21-302а1445), which rejected the judge’s claim and declared regulation No. 775-
vii to be lawful. the supreme Court not only confirmed that the dismissal of the judge 
conformed to legislation, but also assessed the material grounds for such a dismissal, 
namely the adherence to the judge’s oath. the verkhovna rada considered the fact 
that the judge voted for the corresponding decision No. 20-rp/2010 to be a violation 
of his oath. the motivation of the supreme Court was based on the following:
the Constitution of ukraine does not authorize the Constitutional Court 
of ukraine to invalidate a constitutional norm, regardless of the legal form 
in which it was set out.
45  Available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/review/44321854.
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in accordance with paragraph 1 of part 1 of Article 85 of the Constitution 
of ukraine, the verkhovna rada of ukraine is authorized to amend the 
Constitution of ukraine within the scope of, and under the procedure 
provided in, section Xiii of this Constitution.
By its decision No. 20-rp/2010, the Constitutional Court of ukraine... 
did not ensure the supremacy of the Constitution of ukraine, amended it, 
violated the fundamental constitutional principle of democracy, amended the 
constitutional system of ukraine, violated the constitutional principle of the 
distribution of the power and the legitimacy of existing state bodies, which 
resulted in their activities based on norms amended by the Constitutional 
Court of ukraine, and not by the verkhovna rada of ukraine as the duly 
authorized body.
the same judgment was taken with regard to the cases of judges Mikhail kolos 
and Anatoly Golovin (decision of the supreme Court of ukraine of 28 April 2015 
No. 21-67a1446 and decision of the supreme Court of ukraine of 14 March 2018 
No. P/800/120/1447). the supreme Court has not announced the final judgment on the 
complaint of the judge Maria Markush yet (decision of the supreme Administrative 
Court of 26 June 2017 No. 800/162/14 was in her favor48). it is worth noting that judges 
vyacheslav Ovcharenko and Mikhail kolos filed lawsuits to the european Court of 
human rights, which transferred the same to the communication stage.49
it should be noted that the intervention of the supreme Court in the position 
of the CCu, and evaluation of the decisions of the latter is unlikely to fall within the 
competence of the supreme Court itself. Paradoxically since it interfered with the 
power of the CCu without having the right to appraise its decisions, the supreme 
Court itself refers to the CCu exceeding its authority. the supreme Court did not have 
the right to give such a judgment from the standpoint of correctness or incorrectness 
of the decisions of the CCu due to the fact that it (like all public authorities) is to act 
only on the basis, within the limits and in the manner provided by the Constitution 
and laws of ukraine (Articles 6 and 19 of the Constitution of ukraine). the powers of 
the supreme Court do not contain the possibility to review and evaluate decisions of 
the CCu. under the Constitution and the Law “On the Constitutional Court of ukraine” 
its decisions are binding, final, and cannot be appealed. the supreme Court can 
judge the legality of dismissal, but only on formal grounds. here, the supreme Court 
46  Available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/review/44321854.
47  Available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/review/73195164.
48  Available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/review/67828732.
49  Applications Nos. 27276/15 and 33692/15 vyacheslav Andriyovych Ovcharenko against ukraine and 
Mykhaylo ivanovych kolos against ukraine lodged on 20 May 2015 and 2 July 2015 respectively (sep. 15, 
2018), available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-161645”]}.
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of ukraine showed excessive activism which was not completely relevant (and likely 
unjustifiable). After all, it would have been possible to recognize the dismissal as 
legitimate and without getting into the substantive side of the decision of the CCu.
if the supreme Court can call into question the legitimacy of any decision of 
the CCu, recognize the decision to be legal or illegal, why do we need any model 
for specialized constitutional control and the CCu as such? the question is rather 
rhetorical. As is rightly pointed out by vsevolod rechitsky:
Not only investigators, prosecutors and judges of courts of general 
jurisdiction, but also the ukrainian parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, the 
President, local authorities and ordinary citizens of ukraine can doubt (in the 
everyday sense of this word) the qualities of normative collegial decisions and 
conclusions of the Constitutional Court. All this, however, does not mean that 
they can ignore these decisions.50
it is worth noting that the supreme Court of ukraine affirmed the negative 
assessment of the decision of the CCu of 30 september 2010 by the verkhovna rada 
of ukraine. As for voting for other decisions (not related to the restoration of the text 
of the Constitution of ukraine, in particular, No. 3-rp/2012 and No. 2-rp/2013), the 
supreme Court of ukraine had no claims against them. Judge Oleksandr Pasenyuk who 
was also dismissed by the verkhovna rada of ukraine, but who did not take part in 
voting for the decision of 30 september 2010 (decree of the supreme Court of ukraine 
of 2 december 2014 No. 21-340а1451) was reinstated on protocolary grounds.
the fact of the matter is that one of the key problems of the dismissal of judges is 
a possible violation by the verkhovna rada of ukraine of not just ukrainian national 
legislation, but Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of human rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950.
in its judgment of 9 January 2013 in the case of Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine,52 
the european Court of human rights (eChr) criticized the procedure of bringing 
judges to disciplinary responsibility by the parliament at parliamentary committees 
and plenary sessions, noting that the plenary session was not a proper place for 
consideration of the facts and law, the assessment of evidence and the theory. the 
eChr criticized the role of politicians in the parliament which were not required to 
50  Речицький В.В. Чи можна довіряти конституційним суддям? // Українська Гельсінська спілка 
з прав людини. 08.03.2017 [vsevolod v. rechitsky, Can I Trust the Constitutional Judges?, ukrainian 
helsinki human rights union, 8 March 2017] (sep. 15, 2018), available at https://helsinki.org.ua/chy-
mozhna-doviryaty-konstytutsijnym-suddyam-v-rechytskyj/.
51  Available at http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/review/42246614.
52  Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, Judgment, No. 21722/11, 9 January 2013 (sep. 15, 2018), available at 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-
115871%22]}.
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have any legal or judicial experience to establish complex issues of fact and law in 
this case.
it is noteworthy that the supreme Court tried to dismiss the applicability of this 
position of the eChr with regard to the dismissal of judge Anatoly Golovin, empha-
sizing the political nature of the formation of a constitutional jurisdiction body and 
corresponding summary dismissal judgment of such judges.
in this case, however, it is not entirely clear why the summary dismissal procedure 
was not kept in accordance with the ukrainian constitutional reform of justice in 
2016. On the contrary, political subjects were deprived of the right to dismiss judges 
of the CCu before the scheduled date and this right was transferred to the CCu itself. 
in any case, all these arguments will be evaluated in the cases of the judges who 
appealed to the eChr.
if, however, one were to ignore the argument about the amendment of the 
constitutional system and to try to appraise the constitutionality of the Law of 
21 February 2014 without being bound by the reasons and arguments for such 
a restoration, as well as the position of the supreme Court, then, from the formal 
point of view, it can be assumed that this Law was unduly adopted by the verkhovna 
rada of ukraine, or rather, in the absence of the appropriate legal procedure. “the 
restoration of certain provisions of the Constitution” is not provided for in the 
procedures related to the amendments of the Constitution of ukraine, which are set 
out in section Xiii of the Constitution of ukraine, or in other legislative procedures. 
the Constitution of ukraine does not provide for any amendments to the Constitution 
of ukraine in the form of restoration of certain provisions of the Constitution, which 
were amended or declared as unconstitutional, or the corresponding powers in 
the verkhovna rada. in legal science, the existence of such a phenomenon as the 
restoration of the text of the constitution by the parliament is almost unknown, and 
there have not been any relevant theoretical developments in this regard.
According to viktor kolisnyk, the process of restoration of the Constitution of 
ukraine which took place in February 2014, was dubious (as it did not comply with 
the procedure for making constitutional amendments provided for in section Xiii 
of the Constitution of ukraine). the Basic Law of ukraine does not provide the 
parliament with such powers, even by way of a one-off vote. the attempt to restore 
the constitutional system in a non-constitutional way, that is, in violation of the 
procedure for making constitutional amendments and going beyond parliamentary 
powers, cannot be justified or substantiated (including by “political” expediency, 
hard times, and reference to “good” or “noble” intentions).53 As serhii riznyk states, 
the formal requirement, i.e. the necessity to follow the procedure for amending the 
53  Колісник В. Відновлення дії Конституції України та зміна форми правління як засіб поновлення 
конституційного ладу // Вісник Конституційного Суду України. 2015. No. 4. C. 104–105 [viktor kolisnyk, 
Restoration of the Constitution of Ukraine and Change of the Form of Government as a Means of Restoration 
of Constitutional Order, 4 Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of ukraine 103, 104–105 (2015)].
HRYHORII BERCHENKO, SERHII FEDCHYSHYN 59
Constitution of ukraine, was substantially flouted when restoring the constitutional 
reform of 2004 because of the revolution in 2014.54 this inclines us to recognize 
the primary constitutive power (according to Jean-Paul Jacqué) or the sovereign 
dictatorship (according to Carl schmitt) in 2014.
Consequently, on the one hand, there are formal arguments in favor of the provi-
sion of non-compliance with the Law of 21 February 2014 and the resolution of 
22 February 2014 of the Constitution of ukraine for procedural reasons. On the other 
hand, these acts are considered a manifestation of the constituent power of the 
people and are acknowledged as legitimate.
if we follow the formal approach, then, in the case of bringing the matter before 
the CCu, it would be logical to hold unconstitutional the revival of the text of the 
constitution by the parliament in 2014 and its revival (the new abolition of the 2004 
reform) under the CCu decision. At the same time, this raises the same issues that 
arose in connection with decision No. 20-rp/2010 that have already been cited in this 
article. the CCu will have to appraise the consequences of non-compliance with the 
legal procedure if it determines such legal procedure was violated when the text of 
the Constitution of ukraine was restored by the verkhovna rada of ukraine in 2014 
and, as a result, to revive the effect of its1996 wording in a rather ambiguous way. 
this would logically follow from decision No. 20-rp/2010.
Another solution is the acknowledgement of the legitimacy and constitutionality 
of the transformations in February 2014. under this approach, the withdrawal of the 
CCu (by way of referring to the doctrine of the political issue) and refusal to start 
the proceedings in case of a relevant submission to it is also possible. however, 
the second approach can still be considered rather conditional. this is because the 
acknowledgement of the constitutionality of the transformations in 2014 or the 
corresponding withdrawal of the CCu unfortunately will not be able to completely 
sever the Gordian knot of constitutional problems that currently exists.
Conclusion
in summarizing the research on constituent power in ukraine, we can make 
a series of strategic conclusions.
Firstly, the very doctrine of constituent power in ukraine should be based on the 
corresponding concepts, which are due to the emergence of constitutionalism in 
the world as such and revolutionary events, especially in France in the eighteenth 
century. we believe that the ukrainian concept of constituent power should be 
based on the fundamental developments by Carl schmitt, Jean-Paul Jacqué, Andrew 
54  Різник C. Про нез’ясоване питання конституційності актів парламенту, прийнятих в умовах 
Революції Гідності // Вісник Конституційного Суду України. 2015. No. 6. C. 58–66 [serhii riznyk, 
On the Issue of the Constitutionality of the Parliament Acts, Adopted Under the Revolution of Dignity 
Conditions, 6 Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of ukraine 58 (2015)].
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Arato, András sajó and other scholars and should be associated with the process 
of adopting the Constitution and making amendments to it. At the same time, the 
constituent government is simultaneously a scientific concept that explains and 
in some way legitimates corresponding public events. it is a question of division 
of the primary and institutional constituent power of the people. the primary 
constituent power is conceptually close to the sovereign dictatorship (according 
to Carl schmitt). A broad understanding of constituent power and its mixtion with 
popular sovereignty appears to be insufficiently substantiated; but it should be 
referred exclusively to the adoption of the constitution and amendments to it.
secondly, in practice, the doctrine of constituent power strongly influences the 
modern constitutional paradigm of ukraine. it can be clearly stated that the legal 
doctrine in science, as well as the doctrine developed by the CCu, perceives the 
concept of constituent power. At the same time, there is a question regarding the 
actual implementation of the concept of constituent power in ukraine, as opposed to 
its formal existence. it is a question of the nature of the Constitution itself as an act of 
constituent power, but it is still unclear what constituent power the verkhovna rada 
of ukraine implemented – primary or institutional – and it adopted the Constitution. 
similarly, the mechanisms of implementation of constituent power themselves in the 
Constitution of 1996 remain imperfect. we mean the relation between Article 5 of 
the Constitution and its section Xiii. there is absolutely no mechanism to implement 
the constituent power in the part of the adoption of the new Constitution. As for 
the introduction of amendments, there are some questions about the role of the 
people in this mechanism, as well as its improvement as a whole.
thirdly, the practice of amending the Constitution of ukraine has shown 
inconsistency in the interpretation of the primary and institutional constituent 
power. here the constitutional reform of 2004, the interference with this reform by 
the CCu in 2010 and its return by the parliament in 2014 is meant. in 2004, critics 
noticed, in particular, the usurpation of the constituent power by parliament, by the 
CCu in 2010 and by parliament again in 2014. All three times it happened contrary to 
the procedures established for the implementation of the institutional constituent 
power. As you can see, in order to avoid such cases in the future, further doctrinal 
studies of constituent power are extremely necessary. 
Fourthly, a new constitutional reform, conducted in compliance with the existing 
procedure, would be an acceptable solution in ukraine; it would provide a clean 
slate and eliminate the trail of events of 2004, 2010 and 2014 from the text of the 
constitution. in the future, establishing the means of institutional constituent power 
implementation in the text of the reformed Constitution, namely, clear mechanisms 
for amending the Constitution of ukraine and the adoption of a new Constitution, 
which would necessarily include procedures for popular legitimacy, would also be 
an important process.
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